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In a typical modus ponens the reasoner will (a) assert that a premise materially implies a 
conclusion in a given world; (b) assert this premise and (c) infer the conclusion. But this 
restricted modus ponens has little in common with the unrestricted textbook modus ponens, 
since the latter claims that there are no possible worlds where: (a’) a premise materially 
implies a conclusion, (b’) that premise is true and (c’) the conclusion is false. It is clear that 
this textbook modus ponens cannot be a real argumentative form since the same inference 
cannot be repeated across all possible worlds by one reasoner. Moreover, a reasoner can 
accept a material implication in some worlds and not in others.   
So the closest thing to an unrestricted textbook modus ponens would have to require (1) a 
claim to a formal implication as the main assumption; (2) the assumption that a reasoner 
would be willing to accept the conclusion from this claim to formal implication in any 
circumstance where its premise is accepted. The true nature of an unrestricted modus ponens 
is encapsulated in a disposition to infer a conclusion of a formal implication given the 
acceptance of its premise. We can use this information and reinterpret the restricted modus 
ponens as a disposition to infer a conclusion of a material implication in view of the 
acceptance of its premise. So we have two types of modus ponens and each is most plausibly 
interpreted as a reasoner’s willingness to make inferences in some specified circumstances.  
Some conditional logics are motivated by the belief that modus ponens inferences (or at 
least by inferential tests inspired by modus ponens inferences) capture something 
fundamental about conditionals. But that is only one of the potential inferential uses 
associated with conditionals. If we make an effort to understand modus tollens, the resulting 
intuitions will be entirely different. Suppose I say ‘If John is an honest guy, I’m a Dutchman’. 
In such cases the audience is expected to infer that John is not honest from the obvious fact 
that I’m not a Dutchman. This has nothing to do with hypothetical circumstances where the 
premise of the conditional is false. 
Let’s say we make a distinction comparable to that of modus ponens between unrestricted 
and restricted modus tollens. In an unrestricted modus tollens there is a claim to a formal 
implication as the main assumption and the reasoner’s willingness to accept the falsity of its 
premise in any circumstance where its conclusion is denied. In a restricted modus tollens 
there is a claim to a material implication as the main assumption and the reasoner’s 
willingness to accept the falsity of its premise in any circumstance where its conclusion is 
denied.  
In regards to any given conditional you might (A) accept the corresponding claim to 
material or formal implication, or both; (B) have a ponens or a tollens inferential disposition 
in each case, or both; (C) have these inferential dispositions in relation to one specific claim, 
but not the other (see the Dutchman example mentioned above). But whichever is the 
combination, you can’t (I) arbitrarily separate conditionals from arguments as if they were 
connectives instead of claims to implication; (II) deposit all our theoretical efforts in ponens-
centric intuitions.
